Assessing the threat of maritime terrorism: issues for the Asia-Pacific region by Bateman, Sam
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Law - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Business and Law 
1-1-2006 
Assessing the threat of maritime terrorism: issues for the Asia-Pacific 
region 
Sam Bateman 
University of Wollongong, sbateman@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bateman, Sam: Assessing the threat of maritime terrorism: issues for the Asia-Pacific region 2006, 77-91. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/285 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Assessing the threat of maritime terrorism: issues for the Asia-Pacific region 
Abstract 
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Pacific region. It addresses the operational dimensions of the threat to ships and port infrastructure, and 
considers the effectiveness of the international and regional measures that have been introduced in 
recent years to deal with this threat. Based on a proposition that that there has been rather too much 
emphasis on highly remote and speculative “doomsday” scenarios, the article supports the need for 
balance and equity in addressing the risks of maritime terrorism. It identifies types of terrorist attack that 
might be assessed as more credible, as well as some that might be considered less credible. 
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Assessing the Threat of  
Maritime Terrorism: 
Issues for the Asia-Pacific Region 
Sam Bateman 
This article provides a critical assessment of the contemporary threat of maritime terrorism in 
the Asia-Pacific region.  It addresses the operational dimensions of the threat to ships and port 
infrastructure, and considers the effectiveness of the international and regional measures that 
have been introduced in recent years to deal with this threat.  Based on a proposition that that 
there has been rather too much emphasis on highly remote and speculative “doomsday” 
scenarios, the article supports the need for balance and equity in addressing the risks of 
maritime terrorism.  It identifies types of terrorist attack that might be assessed as more 
credible, as well as some that might be considered less credible.  
Maritime Terrorism 
The need to counter the threat of maritime terrorism has led to fundamental 
changes in the international maritime security environment, and the maritime 
strategies of most countries, especially major seaborne trading nations.  The 
maritime terrorist threats within the scope of this paper are possible attacks 
on a port facility or a ship at sea or in a port within the Asia-Pacific region.  It 
does not address supply chain issues or the use of the maritime 
transportation system to carry terrorists or their materials, possibly through 
the use of shipping containers - in the worst case scenario, a weapon of 
mass destruction (WMD).  The paper focuses on operational considerations 
related directly to ships and ports.  Measures such as the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), 
and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to secure the supply chain or 
prevent the proliferation of WMD are beyond the scope of this paper.  
Seaborne trade is of great importance in the Asia-Pacific region.  This is a 
consequence of both the maritime nature of the region and the fact that the 
booming economies of the modern world are all within the region.  Seaborne 
trade gains additional importance in the Western Pacific and East Asia 
because of the archipelagic nature of this part of the world.  Except in parts 
of China and the Malay Peninsula, there is no developed land transport 
infrastructure on the East Asian mainland, and foreign trade perforce must 
be carried by sea or air.  East Asian ports are mainly linked by sea and intra-
regional seaborne trade is of great significance.  Furthermore, the 
archipelagic countries of Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia all have large 
domestic commercial shipping fleets essential for their domestic trade.  
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Shipping and seaborne trade are considered by many analysts to be 
vulnerable to terrorist attack.  This assessment is based on the quantities of 
cargo involved, international shipping’s diverse and large international labour 
force, difficulties of enforcement both in port and at sea, and the poor 
regulatory environment of the international shipping industry with low levels 
of accountability, complicated chains of ownership, and a high incidence of 
fraudulent documentation.1  Terrorists could potentially exploit these 
weaknesses to use sea transport for their evil purposes, or to launch an 
attack on shipping and port infrastructure that could cause massive 
economic disruption.  Within the region, one writer has claimed that 
Southeast Asia is now the centre of global maritime terrorism.2 
The need to counter the threat of maritime terrorism has led to fundamental 
changes in the international maritime security environment.  The new 
counter-measures have imposed large additional costs on the global 
transport system and have required significant effort from both government 
and industry.  However so far, the maritime terrorist threat has had no 
significant impact on the volume or pattern of international seaborne trade.  
There has been stronger than expected economic growth in Asia, and this 
would not have been any different without the terrorist attacks on the World 
Center in New York on 11 September 2001 (9/11).  
Maritime Security 
Events of 9/11 and perceptions of a terrorist threat to shipping have forced a 
reappraisal of the concept of maritime security.  The concept has a 
traditional meaning for navies and defence forces with their role of protecting 
the nation and its national interests against threats primarily of a military 
nature.  However, the concept of maritime security has expanded following 
9/11.  It is still about protecting national security but instead of overt threats 
from military forces, there is a new emphasis on asymmetric threats, 
including both maritime terrorism and piracy.  This focus is apparent in the 
work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) directed towards 
enhancing the security of international shipping and seaborne trade.  
The new approach to maritime security is based on a range of security- and 
military based measures.  The IMO, primarily through the International Ship 
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and related measures, has built up 
the physical and personal security of ships and ports, while the US has led 
the militarized approaches evident in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) 
championed by the Bush Administration. 
                                                
1 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Security in Maritime 
Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact, Paris: OECD, July 2003, p. 5 
2 Rommel C. Banlaoi, ‘Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia – the Abu Sayyaf Threat’, Naval 
War College Review, Autumn 2005, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 63-80. 
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The militarizing of the terrorist threat is demonstrated by the War in Iraq, the 
operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the tacit support by the 
US for Israel in its fight against Hezbollah.  All of these operations have a 
significant maritime dimension, and the US Navy is developing a new 
Maritime Strategy, which will recognise the GWOT as the Navy’s top priority, 
along with defending the US Homeland against terrorist attack.3  The new 
Maritime Strategy will have a strong emphasis on international cooperation 
effectively encouraging other countries to increase their military spending to 
meet the threat of maritime terrorism.  This approach does not recognise 
that the fight against terrorism cannot be won by military force alone but 
requires a concerted effort based on diplomacy, intelligence, education, and 
winning community support.4  Increased military spending involves high 
opportunity costs through its diversion of resources from social, economic 
and educational measures that might alleviate root causes of terrorism.  
There is also a close relationship between maritime safety and maritime 
security.  While a distinction between the two meanings is apparent in 
English, in some languages they are almost synonymous.5  Safety and 
security are not mutually exclusive.  Even the IMO has changed its motto 
from “safer ships, cleaner oceans” to “safe, secure and efficient shipping on 
clean oceans” to reflect this new emphasis.  The operational measures to 
provide maritime security, including the prevention of all forms of illegal 
activity at sea, also provide additional safety at sea. 
At a national level, these developments have brought more agencies into 
play with maritime security.  While navies see their business as protecting 
the nation and national interests at sea, most navies are not responsible for 
the security of port facilities or ships in port.  These activities are the 
responsibilities of the marine police or coast guard.  Similar considerations 
apply to policing at sea.  Just as on land where most countries apply a clear 
separation between the civil police and the military, a similar distinction can 
exist at sea between the roles of a navy and those of a coast guard.6  This 
distinction is becoming even more apparent in the post 9/11 environment.  In 
Australia, for example, maritime security is now a shared responsibility 
between Defence, Coastwatch, and the Office of Transport Security, as well 
                                                
3 Christopher P. Cava, ‘U.S. Navy Chief calls for New ‘Maritime Strategy’’, Defense News 
online, June 15, 2006, and Sam Bateman, ‘Navies of the World Unite! Will the New U.S. 
Maritime Strategy Work?’, IDSS Commentary 79/2006, Singapore: Institute of Defence and 
Strategic Studies (IDSS), 11 August 2006 
4 Tom Quiggin, ‘Time for a Different Approach in the War on Terrorism?’, IDSS Commentary 
82/2006, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), 15 August 2006. 
5 Maximo Quibranza Mejia Jr, ‘Defining maritime violence and maritime security’ in Proshanto K. 
Mukherjee, Maximo Q. Meija Jr, Gotthard M. Gauci (eds), Maritime violence and other security 
issues at sea, Proceedings of the Symposium on Maritime Violence and other Security Issues 
at Sea, August 2002, World Maritime University, Malmo, Sweden, p. 28. 
6 This paper uses the term “coast guard” to refer to the para-military policing forces at sea, 
although they may have different names in different countries e.g. the Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency or the Korean National Maritime Police. 
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as other agencies at the State and Federal levels.7  This wider definition of 
maritime security puts a premium on inter-agency coordination, both at the 
national and regional levels, and the lack of this coordination is often a 
barrier to effective maritime security in the region. 
“New” Threats 
Piracy and maritime terrorism have become the “new” threats to maritime 
security in the Asia-Pacific region.  While acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships have a long history in Asian waters, particularly in Southeast 
Asia, international interest in the piracy threat has been much higher in 
recent years.  Several factors explain this.  First, the incidence of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships has led to assessments of higher risks of 
terrorist attack, and actions to counter piracy are seen as also reducing the 
risks of terrorist attack.8  Secondly, Northeast Asian countries, particularly 
China, Japan and South Korea, are highly dependent on energy supplies 
from the Middle East and have become concerned about the security of 
tankers carrying these supplies, as well as other shipping, passing through 
“choke points” in Southeast Asia.  Thirdly, the United States with its heavy 
involvement in the Middle East is concerned about strategic mobility 
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans with most US Navy ships and 
submarines in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean being deployed from 
bases in the Pacific.  Lastly, the major regional sea powers, as well as the 
United States, all have strategic motivation to establish a presence in 
Southeast Asia and may use the threats of piracy and terrorism to justify that 
presence.  
Whether or not all this increased attention is justified is open to question.  
There was a marked fall in the number of piracy attacks in 2005,9 and the 
types of attack that are carried out are not those that warrant the direct 
operational involvement of non-littoral countries in providing maritime 
security in Southeast Asian waters.  Most attacks are on vessels in port or at 
anchor off a port.  These attacks are usually of a minor nature and will only 
be countered by more effective policing by port authorities, and not by 
international action although some assistance with building the capacity of 
the port authorities would be useful.  Furthermore, attacks on vessels 
                                                
7 The complex arrangements for comprehensive maritime security in Australia are discussed in 
Bateman, S., Bergin, A., Tsamenyi, M. and Woolner, D., ‘Integrated maritime enforcement and 
compliance in Australia’ in Rothwell, D. and VanderZwaag, D. (eds), Towards Principled 
Oceans Governance - Australian and Canadian approaches and challenges (Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2006), pp. 119-142 
8 See for example, Gal Luft and Anne Korin, ‘Terrorism Goes to Sea’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, 
No.6, September/October 2004, pp. 61-71. This paper, however, was later roundly criticised in a 
letter from an established expert on piracy to the Editor of Foreign Affairs its “uncritically 
repeating myths, half truths and unsupportable assertions of an alleged nexus of piracy and 
terrorism”.  Charles Dragonette, ‘Lost at Sea’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005. 
9  International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Annual 
Report for the Period 1 January- 31 December 2005, 31 January 2006. 
Security Challenges 
Volume 2 Number 3 (October 2006)  - 81 - 
underway are mainly on smaller, more vulnerable vessels in local trades.  
“Mainline” container vessels and large tankers on international voyages 
through the Malacca and Singapore Straits between Europe or the Middle 
East and East Asia are not attacked unless they slow down, anchor or 
stop.10  Yet these are the vessels that are the focus of international interest 
in, and offers of assistance with the security of shipping using the Straits.  
The potential for cooperation between pirates and terrorists has probably 
been overstated.11  Piracy and maritime terrorism might involve a similar 
modus operandi by the attackers but a distinction exists between the two 
acts with piracy being conducted for private ends while terrorism has political 
motives.  In assessments of the risk of maritime terrorism, pirates have been 
seen as having skills and expertise that might be attractive to a terrorist 
group, but these are not so specialised that they are not readily available.  
There are many former naval personnel, fishermen and commercial 
seafarers in the region with knowledge and experience that could be used by 
a terrorist group.  A distinction must also be drawn between terrorists using 
piracy and armed robbery against vessels to raise funds on the one hand, 
and the direct targeting of a ship or port facility as an act of terrorism on the 
other.  Both Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in northern Sumatra and the Abu 
Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines have carried out attacks, including 
kidnappings for ransom, to raise funds.  
Assessing the Threat 
There have been relatively few confirmed acts of maritime terrorism.  
Passenger ships and ferries have been preferred targets with the sinking of 
Superferry 14 in February 2004 near Manila in the Philippines being the 
most serious act of maritime terrorism so far in terms of loss of life with 116 
people killed.12  However, the attacks on the USS Cole in Aden in October 
2000 and on the French tanker Limburg off Yemen in 2004 usually attract 
most attention in writings on maritime terrorism because they were initiated 
by al-Qaeda and occurred in the context of 9/11.  Numerous maritime 
terrorist attacks by the “Sea Tigers” of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) on both merchant ships and Sri Lankan warships are also often cited 
                                                
10 Sam Bateman, Catherine Zara Raymond and Joshua Ho, Safety and Security in the Malacca 
and Singapore Straits – An Agenda for Action, Singapore, Institute of Defence and Strategic 
Studies (IDSS), May 2006, 
11 Adam Young and Mark J. Valencia, ‘Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: 
Rectitude and Utility’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.25, No.2, August 2003, pp. 269-283. 
12 Other attacks on ferries in Southeast Asia include the February 2000 bombing of the 
Philippine ferry Our Lady Mediatrix, which killed forty people; and the December 2001 bombing 
of the Indonesian ferry Kailifornia, which killed ten. John F. Bradford, ‘The Growing Prospects 
for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia’, Naval War College Review, Summer 
2005, Vol.58, No.3, p. 67. 
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as examples of what might be possible, including the assessment that al-
Qaeda has benefited from the techniques of the LTTE.13 
It is not too difficult to conjure up “doomsday” scenarios for a maritime 
terrorist attack.  A ship carrying a highly dangerous cargo could be hijacked 
and used as a floating bomb to destroy a port and cause large loss of human 
life, or a shipping container or a ship itself could be used to import a WMD.14  
However, these are low probability, high consequence scenarios that can 
lead to some lack of balance in decision-making both by Governments and 
the business sector.  Assessments of the threat of maritime terrorism must 
be rational and represent a reasonable balance between the likelihood of an 
attack occurring and the costs of providing adequate security against such 
an attack.  The assessments depend on a multitude of factors, especially the 
capabilities and intentions of prospective maritime terrorists, the vulnerability 
of particular targets, and the consequences of an attack should one occur.  
Terrorist Capabilities 
The main maritime terrorist threat in Southeast Asia is usually seen as 
coming from al-Qaeda and its associated groups, particularly Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).  These groups have 
training camps in the southern Philippines where they train together and 
share expertise.15  Members of these groups routinely move between 
Sabah, Indonesian Borneo and these camps by speedboat, local craft and 
ferries.  The ASG in the Philippines has already shown that it can attack 
ships having claimed responsibility for the Superferry 14 attack, and more 
recently, has been blamed for the bomb attack on the ferry Dona Ramona in 
August 2005 as the ship was about to depart from the port of Zamboanga.16  
These attacks show that ferries, and potentially cruise liners, are vulnerable 
to attack.  With passenger ships and ferries, it is not so much the bomb that 
does the damage but rather the fire and panic that might follow an explosion 
with so many people in a relatively confined area.  In March 2004, Philippine 
military sources were quoted as saying that the ASG was training with JI to 
prepare for possible seaborne and underwater attacks outside the 
Philippines.17 
In relative terms, maritime targets may be less attractive than land or air 
targets.  Ships at sea are difficult targets, and an attack on port infrastructure 
may have rather less impact than an attack on a major building or facility 
                                                
13 Rohan Gunaratna ‘Terrorist threat to shipping is ‘imminent and growing’’ Lloyd’s List, 
Wednesday 29 September 2004. 
14 Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade – Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004, pp. 112-
133. 
15 Rommel Banlaoi, ‘Romulo: RP won’t be frontline of terror attack’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
August 13, 2005, p. .A1. 
16 ‘Ferry Blast Injures 30 in Southern Philippines’, The New York Times online, August 28, 2005. 
17 ‘Terrorists train for Seaborne Attacks’, JoyoNews, Joyo@aol.com, Friday March 18, 2005. 
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(such as a mass transportation system) that has both high economic and 
iconic value.  Unless a ship itself was used as a bomb or as a means of 
introducing a WMD, a maritime terrorist attack may not cause large loss of 
life.  Even then, a terrorist group would require very specialised skills and 
capabilities before it could even have a modicum of confidence that the 
mission might be a success.  From a terrorist viewpoint, hijacking a ship to 
use as a floating bomb would have a lower probability of a successful 
outcome than hijacking an aircraft for a 9/11 type mission or placing a bomb 
on a crowded train.  The destruction of a port facility might have significant 
economic impact but might not loom large in the public consciousness.  The 
potential list of targets for a terrorist is limitless but maritime targets may not 
be high on the list.  The preferred targets for terrorists are likely to remain on 
land where, as shown by the attacks on mass urban transport in London and 
Madrid, success is more readily assured.  
Threats to Ships 
Ships are more vulnerable in port, or in the approaches to a port, than when 
they are at sea where they might gain considerable protection from their size 
and speed.  Most large, modern merchant ships travel at speeds in excess 
of fourteen knots and it is both difficult and dangerous for small craft to 
attempt to approach them at this speed.  Smaller ships and vessels 
alongside or at anchor figure prominently in the statistics on acts of piracy 
and armed attacks on ships collected by the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB).  In port, ships face threats from the landside, small boats and 
underwater swimmers.  The attack on USS Cole demonstrated this 
vulnerability.  This has led to the USN and other Western navies much 
greater attention to the force protection of their ships during port calls.18 
The ships that are most vulnerable to terrorist attack are those carrying 
hazardous or dangerous cargoes that could turn the ship into a bomb, 
passenger ferries and cruise liners, as well as naval vessels.  Smaller 
tankers with cargoes of lighter more volatile crude oils, as well as refined 
products such as gasoline, kerosene, and diesoline, are potentially a greater 
risk than large ships carrying heavy crude oil which is difficult to ignite.  
While most attention has focused on the larger tankers and liquid natural gas 
(LNG) carriers, smaller vessels such as product tankers, Liquid petroleum 
gas (LPG) carriers and chemical tankers are more prominent in the piracy 
statistics and may be more vulnerable to terrorist attack.19  These vessels 
are generally slower than larger vessels, and have smaller crews and lower 
freeboards.  But generally, it remains the case that gas carriers and tankers 
are more vulnerable when loading or unloading than at sea.  Thus the 
                                                
18 For example, each USN ship has an integrated tactical team (SITT) that protects the ship 
against a variety of threats while in port. Paul Mullen and Jon Bartee, ‘Put a SWAT Team on 
Every Ship’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2002, pp. 30-33, 
19 Bateman, Raymond and Ho, Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, p. 23-
4. 
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problem is more one of terminal security rather than of ship security and of 
providing security for ships entering port.  
Threats to Ports 
There are at least 1,600 ports around the world used by ships trading 
internationally.  Port security, and maritime security more generally, are very 
different to aviation security.  The public generally understands and accepts 
the need for aviation security, but this may not be so with maritime security.  
The security of ports and ships must consider all environments: land, air, sea 
surface and sub-surface.  Airports have defined perimeters and usually 
some form of “buffer zone” between an airport and other activities.  Access 
to an airport is more easily controlled than to a port.  Airline passengers 
expect to be screened with their baggage and airline and airport workers can 
be closely monitored.  In comparison, ports may not have a clearly defined 
perimeter, even on the landside where they might be located in or adjacent 
to heavily populated urban areas.  Ports vary greatly with regard to their 
physical attributes while airports are all basically similar.  Each port is 
different by virtue of its geography, topography, surroundings and 
population.20  Ports by their very nature are vulnerable.  They are busy areas 
with access both by land and sea.  While separate facilities may not be large 
in area, the geographical extent of a port may be very wide.  
Waterside security will generally be more difficult and costly than landside 
security.  While tight physical security might be possible on the entry points 
to a port from the landside, it is extremely difficult to secure a port and the 
ships in it from attacks launched from the seaward, particularly if there is a 
high level of small craft activity in the port.  Singapore has recognised this 
vulnerability with the introduction of the Harbour Craft Transponder System 
(HARTS) that requires all watercraft using its ports to be fitted with a 
transponder that identifies the craft to monitors onshore.  Singapore also 
uses Accompanying Sea Security Teams (ASSeT) teams to board and 
protect selected ships deemed to pose a greater risk to the port prior to their 
entering harbour or while they are transiting through Singapore’s waters.21 
In the US, the Department of Homeland Security has been criticised for 
spending millions of dollars on port security without sufficiently focusing on 
those that are most vulnerable.22  There would appear to be a need now to 
modify this approach somewhat by concentrating on key vulnerabilities, 
including the security of the full supply chain, and the identification of ships, 
port facilities and cargoes that pose the greater risks.  For example, a petro-
chemical port facility located in a built-up area is clearly much more 
                                                
20 Chris Mayer, ‘Access and identity are key points’, Lloyd’s List, Thursday September 30, 2005. 
21 ‘Singapore Navy to escort passing merchant ships to stop terrorism’, Khaleej Times online, 28 
February 2005. 
22 Eric Lipton, ‘Audit Faults U.S. for Its Spending on Port Defence’, The New York Times, 
February 20, 2005. 
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vulnerable than a bulk ore or grain loading facility in a remote area.  There is 
also the consideration that an oil refinery or a LNG terminal is a more 
feasible target for a terrorist group than using a ship as a “floating bomb”.  
Probably too much emphasis has been given to “worst case” scenarios.  
Attack Scenarios 
It is instructive to identify potential types of attack that terrorists might make 
against maritime targets.  Possible attack scenarios are grouped below 
according to the ones deemed less credible and those considered more 
credible.  The focus of these scenarios is on threats to ships and port 
infrastructure emanating from the sea.  The groupings below are based on 
judgments relating to the capabilities of known terrorist groups, the ease with 
which particular types of attack might be launched, and the probability of a 
successful outcome for the terrorists.  
LESS CREDIBLE SCENARIOS 
• Ship sunk to block the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.  This is a 
popular attack scenario among some academics and sections of the 
media but in reality, this scenario must be assessed as less credible, 
if not even as impossible.23  There are several reasons for this.  First 
is the width of the Straits.  Even at the most narrow point of the 
traffic separation scheme (TSS) off One Fathom Bank, the channel 
is still 0.6 nautical miles (or about 1,000 metres) wide.  Thus more 
than one large vessel would have to be sunk in the correct position 
to effectively block this side of the TSS and even then, it would be a 
simple matter of traffic management to temporarily route deep 
draught vessels on the other side of the TSS, and vessels of lesser 
draught could be routed outside of the TSS.  The second reason 
concerns the difficulties of hijacking a large vessel and managing to 
sink it in an optimum position.  This would be an extremely 
demanding task even for highly experienced seafarers working with 
the assistance of tugs.  An associated scenario of attacking a large 
tanker in a narrow part of the TSS, and causing a fire and explosion 
onboard so that a large burning oil slick was created is marginally 
more credible.24 
• Ship with hazardous or dangerous cargo used as “floating bomb”.  
This is another popular scenario among many commentators but it is 
also assessed as less credible.  The types of ship that are often 
considered in this scenario are the larger tankers and LNG carriers 
although consideration should also be given to vessels such as 
                                                
23 Catherine Zara Raymond, ‘Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Potential Scenarios’, 
Terrorism Monitor, Vol.14, Issue 7, April 6, 2006, p. 2. 
24 Neela Bannerjee and Keith Bradsher, ‘A Vulnerable Time to be Moving Oil by Sea’, The New 
York Times online, 19 October 2002. 
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chemical tankers and ships with volatile cargoes (e.g. ammonium 
nitrate).  Again there would be problems with successfully hijacking 
such a vessel and then navigating it into a position where maximum 
damage might result from an explosion onboard.  More importantly 
however, even the most technically competent terrorists could not be 
confident that an attack of this nature would succeed.  Missile 
attacks on tankers during the “tanker war” of the 1980s25 showed 
how difficult it is to ignite a fire on a tanker.  Similarly expert opinion 
suggests how difficult it would be to cause an LNG carrier to 
explode.26  A smaller tanker, LPG carrier, or chemical tanker with a 
volatile substance onboard may be a better prospect from a terrorist 
view point,27 although the extent of damage caused will be less than 
that from an attack on a larger vessel.  Smaller vessels might be 
more easily hijacked than a larger ship, and with their smaller crews, 
it might even be possible to hide the fact from port authorities that 
the vessel had been hijacked and was being operated by a terrorist 
crew.  
• Underwater swimmer attack on ship or port facility.  There have 
been reports of Al Qaeda and ASG groups developing skills in 
underwater diving with a view to developing a capability to attack a 
ship or port facility.28  However, the skills and capabilities required 
for a successful attack are quite sophisticated and in relative terms, 
may not be worth investment by terrorists.  However, warships, 
particularly in a port where the waterfront might be less secure, 
could be vulnerable to this type of attack.  
MORE CREDIBLE SCENARIOS 
• Bomb attack on cruise liner or passenger ferry.  While maritime 
security experts generally believe that passenger vessels do not 
make good targets because they have so many people onboard and 
are not easy to board, nevertheless they are vulnerable to terrorist 
attack by placing bombs onboard.  This has been demonstrated by 
several attacks on passenger ferries in the Philippine and 
Indonesian archipelagoes in recent years, including that on the 
Superferry 14.  The problem is not so much the actual explosion but 
the fire and panic that invariably follow.  The large loss of life on the 
Superferry 14 was not caused by the bomb but by poor fire fighting 
and evacuation procedures.  
• “Choke point” blocked by sea mines.  This scenario is the one that 
might cause the highest level of economic disruption possibly 
                                                
25 Nicholas Tracy, Attack on Maritime Trade, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991, pp. 224 -230, 
26 Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, p. 43. 
27 Bateman, Raymond and Ho, Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, p. 24. 
28 ‘Terrorists train for Seaborne Attacks’, JoyoNews, Joyo@aol.com, Friday March 18, 2005. 
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without even any direct damage being caused.  The mining of a ship 
in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the sighting of a mine, or even 
just a declaration that mines had been dropped in the Straits could 
lead to the re-routing of most shipping traffic away from the Straits.  
During the “tanker war” of the 1980s, the laying of mines was 
arguably more successful in disrupting shipping traffic than the use 
of anti-ship missiles.29  In comparison with other scenarios 
discussed in this section, this scenario might seem a low cost option 
for a terrorist group.  The waters of the Straits are shallow and ideal 
for mining by either floating mines or mines placed on the sea 
bottom.  This scenario would require a multinational response and 
this has been recognised by the attention given by the Western 
Pacific Naval Symposium to mine counter-measure exercises, 
including in waters off Singapore.30 
• Suicide attack by small craft.  Following the suicide small boat 
attacks on the tanker Limburg and the USS Cole, as well as 
attempted attacks on other US warships, speedboats may be 
“emerging as the weapon of choice” of maritime terrorists.31  While 
these small craft offer advantages in terms of speed, stealth and 
surprise, there also has to be some qualifications as to where such 
attacks are likely.  The Limburg and Cole attacks both occurred in 
potentially “unfriendly waters” in areas where terrorist groups are 
known to exist.  This type of attack would be less likely in more 
secure “friendly waters”, where it would be difficult for the terrorists 
to establish a launching area for the attack. 
Measures to Counter the Threat 
The global solutions to problems of maritime security have been pitched at 
several levels, including the physical security of ships and ports, operational 
cooperation at sea, the tracking of vessels, the integrity of container cargo, 
and enhancing seafarer identity documentation.  They include the new 
measures by the IMO, particularly the ISPS Code, other amendments to the 
1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, such as the mandatory 
fitting of ship-borne Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), and planned 
amendments to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
                                                
29 Tracy, Attack on Maritime Trade, p. 229. 
30 The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) is a consortium of 18 Western Pacific navies 
and 4 observer navies.  In June 2001, Singapore hosted the first WPNS mine countermeasures 
and diving exercises involving 16 countries, 15 ships and 1,500 personnel.  Sea Power Centre – 
Australia, ‘The Western Pacific Naval Symposium’, Semaphore, Issue 5, March 2006 (available 
on the website at <www.navy.gov.au/spc/>). 
31 Captain James Pelkofski USN, ‘Before the Storm: Al Qaeda’s Coming Maritime Campaign’, 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 131 No.12, December 2005, p. 22, 
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against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) and its Protocol 
covering offshore facilities.32 
ISPS CODE 
The ISPS Code has been a great success.  It has had benefits going well 
beyond the greater security of ships and port facilities that are required to 
conform to the Code.  These benefits include greater awareness of security 
throughout maritime industry, and the reduction of other forms of maritime 
crime, including cargo fraud and cargo pilfering.  Giving an officer a specific 
responsibility for managing the security of a ship also helps increase security 
awareness onboard and reduces the overall vulnerability of the ship.  
Notwithstanding the benefits, there are residual problems with the Code’s 
effectiveness.  It applies only to the so-called “SOLAS ships” i.e. commercial 
ships over 500 gross tonnage employed on international voyages.  Unless 
extended by national legislation,33 it does not apply to fishing vessels, ships 
under 500 gross tonnage, or to ships employed only in the domestic trade.  
The number of vessels to which the ISPS code does not apply is particularly 
large in the Asia-Pacific region where there are large fishing fleets, many 
smaller trading vessels, and big domestic commercial fleets, particularly in 
China, Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines.34 
The ISPS Code imposes significant additional costs on ship-owners, 
including possibly having to employ extra crew.35  The OECD estimated that 
the initial burden on ship operators to be at least US$1,279 million and 
US$730 million per year thereafter, primarily for additional management staff 
and security-related equipment.36  There may be some irony here in that the 
international shipping market is buoyant at present, and the market may be 
absorbing the costs of the new maritime security measures.  A “crunch” may 
well come with the next slump in global shipping. 
Lastly, and despite some rhetoric to the contrary, the ISPS Code, like other 
instruments of international law, cannot be enforced effectively.  The IMO 
can monitor compliance but ultimately it depends on individual countries 
effectively implementing the Code.  Flag states have to ensure compliance 
                                                
32 A new Protocol to the SUA Convention has been adopted by the IMO.  It includes new 
offences and expanded provisions on ship-boarding.  New provisions allow flag states to 
request assistance with ship-boarding and law enforcement, or another Party to seek the 
approval of a flag state to board and search a suspect ship claiming the nationality of the flag 
state. 
33 The Maritime Transport Security Act (Commonwealth) 2003 in Australia, for example, extends 
ISPS provisions to all ships employed on interstate voyages but not to ones employed on 
intrastate voyages. 
34 James Brewer, ‘Small vessels, big security risk’, Lloyd’s List, Tuesday June 7, 2005. 
35 Katrin Berkenkopf, ‘ISPS benefits doubtful, says German tramp owner’, Lloyd’s List online, 
October 28, 2004  
36 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Security in Maritime 
Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact, Paris: OECD, July 2003, p. 2. 
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of ships flying their flag, port states have to manage implementation of the 
Code in their ports and port facilities, and seafarer supplying countries, such 
as Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines, have to have the bureaucracy 
in place to implement new seafarer identity documentation requirements. 
SUA CONVENTION  
There are about a dozen international conventions dealing with the threat of 
terrorism but only the SUA Convention and its Protocol relate to terrorism at 
sea.  The purpose of this Convention was to close the gap created by the 
limited definition of piracy already mentioned.  These limitations were 
brought to light by the Achille Lauro incident in 1985.  This was not an act of 
piracy because the terrorists, who seized the ship, were traveling as 
passengers onboard the vessel.37  The SUA Convention extends coastal 
State enforcement jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits, and in particular 
circumstances, allows exercise of such jurisdiction in an adjacent State’s 
territorial sea.  The fact that some Southeast Asian countries have still to 
ratify the SUA Convention is probably due to some sensitivity to extra-
territorial aspects of the Convention. 
An IMO Diplomatic Conference in October 2005 adopted new Protocols to 
the SUA Convention and its related protocol on Fixed Platforms.  These 
provide an international treaty framework for combating and prosecuting 
individuals who use a ship as a weapon or means of committing a terrorist 
attack, or transport by ship terrorists or cargo intended for use in connection 
with weapons of mass destruction programs.38  A mechanism is also 
provided to facilitate the boarding in international waters of vessels 
suspected of engaging in these activities.  These expanded provisions of the 
SUA Convention through the introduction of this Protocol are unlikely to 
make the Convention any more attractive to those countries, which so far 
have chosen not to ratify it. 
TRACKING SHIPS 
In an ideal world, ships would move around the world like civil aircraft, being 
passed from one system of traffic control to another.  With initiatives 
promoted by the US and now under consideration by the IMO for the Long 
Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of vessels, a system may 
eventually emerge for commercial ships above a certain size and making 
use of AIS data.  The US intends to develop a system that will integrate 
current and future surveillance and tracking resources to identify and track 
                                                
37 The Achille Lauro affair occurred in the Mediterranean when Arab terrorists took over the 
cruise liner, killing an elderly American tourist in the process.  It was not an intentional terrorist 
act rather an unfortunate incident resulting after four terrorists trying to get to Israel were caught 
off guard when a steward entered their cabin and found them cleaning their weapons.  The 
Achille Lauro affair, however, has had major consequences, including disputes between the 
United States and other countries on issues of criminal jurisdiction. 
38 U.S. Department of State, ‘Protocols to the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)’, Fact Sheet, October 21, 2005. 
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the world’s 121,000 merchant ships of more than 300 tons.39  It will use a 
data base similar to that used for tracking Soviet submarines during the Cold 
War.  However, many other vessels using the world’s oceans remain outside 
its scope.  This inability to monitor the movement of fishing vessels, as well 
as cruising yachts and other private vessels, remains a major gap in 
international arrangements for maritime security.  
Even with current LRIT plans, there are still unresolved issues.  It is by no 
means certain, for example, that a coastal state has a right to identify and 
track ships exercising the freedom of navigation either through its exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas, and not intending to proceed to a 
port or an anchorage located within the territory of that coastal state.40  As 
well as tracking at sea, an effective international system should also include 
standardised reporting of shipping arrivals and departures but this might 
arouse both security and commercial sensitivities.  And again, there will be 
issues with enforcing the system.  For example, while the ISPS Code 
requires that ships be fitted with AIS transponders, many ships may be 
turning the transponders off when at sea.  If queried on this, it is all too easy 
say that the equipment was malfunctioning.  
Conclusions 
The maritime transportation industry has been greatly affected by the threat 
of maritime terrorism.  It now has a vastly different regulatory environment to 
the one that prevailed prior to 9/11.  However, there are still grounds for 
reservations about the credibility of the terrorist threat to shipping and the 
cost-benefits of the new counter-measures.  Despite assertions about the 
risks and outcomes of a catastrophic maritime terrorist attack, the maritime 
terrorist incidents, which have occurred, have had little impact on the free 
movement of shipping and seaborne trade in comparison with the massive 
costs of implementing the new counter-measures.  
So far the approach to countering the threat of maritime terrorism has been 
a generalised one with all ships and ports being required to meet new 
international standards.  It has also been a defensive one based on a 
“guards, guns and gates” approach that is not designed to get industry or 
community support, or to get at the root causes of terrorism.  Recent 
counter-measures to the threat of maritime terrorism have imposed major 
additional costs on ship-owners, ports and shippers.41  They are also 
imposing delays on port operations and slowing down the process of 
                                                
39 David Munns, ‘121,000 Tracks’, Seapower, July 2005, pp. 10-13.  
40 Hartmut Hesse and Nicolaos L. Charalambous, ‘New Security Measures for the International 
Shipping Community’ WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 2004, Vol.3, No.2, p. 138. 
41 A study conducted by the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) concluded that Malaysia’s 
efforts to comply with the ISPS Code cost her ports US$21.5 million and shipping companies 
US$2.8 million.  Noor Apandi Osman, ‘Financial Implications of the ISPS Code in Malaysia’, 
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international trade.42  Ports have introduced significant extra charges to 
cover the costs of additional security; insurance companies have increased 
security premiums; and providers of security services and equipment are 
doing good business.  In some ways, a displacement of goals has occurred.  
While the stated objective of the new measures is to protect the maritime 
transportation system, ships and ports from being used for terrorist 
purposes, the real benefits have been in terms of enhanced cargo security, 
reduced illegal use of shipping containers and customs fraud.  
The new focus on maritime security has led to an environment of increased 
naval and military spending, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.  When 
developing countries in the region should be pursuing programmes that 
would drive down poverty and social unrest and thus remove root causes of 
piracy and terrorism, they are being pressed to increase their defence 
spending to provide greater security in their adjacent waters.  While the US 
sees this greater security as part of the GWOT, the target countries are 
increasing their defence spending for more conventional reasons and 
against more traditional threats.  These militarized and security-based 
approaches have high opportunity costs and could well have serious 
adverse consequences in the future.  
It is time now for a reality check and to consider the broader maritime 
strategic and security environment rather than remaining fixated on the 
threat of maritime terrorism.  Problems such as the root causes of piracy and 
terrorism and the ready availability of small arms around the world must be 
addressed.  There must also be some limit to the current booming levels of 
naval arms spending in the region.43  This spending diverts resources from 
measures to address poverty and promote economic development.  
Meanwhile, the international community seems to be giving lower priority 
and fewer resources to measures to protect and preserve the marine 
environment and to conserve its biodiversity, despite the established 
importance of the health of the oceans to the future of the world.44 
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